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The history of foreign lending in the 19th and 20th centuries offers a rich lode of 
evidence on the operation of international  capital markets.  The last hundred years have 
been punctuated by a series of crises -- in the 1870s,  1890s and 1930s to cite three 
instances -- bearing  a striking resemblance  to the debt crisis of the 1980s.  For the 
historian,  that experience provides an exceptional  opportunity  to study the long-term 
evolution of international  markets and their adaptation  to repeated shocks.  For the 
economist, it provides an opportunity  to reflect on how  the current debt crisis may be 
resolved.  It is not possible  to extrapolate  directly from historical experience,  since 
institutional  aspects of the lending process, including the relative importance of bank and 
bond finance,  the rise of supranational  agencies  such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, and the role of creditor-country  governments  in 
rescheduling,  have changed fundamentally over the past century.  But even though the 
extent of institutional  variation renders naive  the hope that one might be able to draw 
simple  'lessons from the past,' it still offers the only evidence we have on the efficiency 
and distributional  effects of different  approaches  to organizing  international  lending and 
readjusting existing debts. 
In  a series of papers we have examined  the interwar debt crisis from this 
perspectivejJ  Our analysis  has spanned the lending of the 1920s,  the defaults of the 
1930s, and the debt readjustments  of the 1940s and 1950s.  This paper summarizes  and 
extends the main conclusions i  that research. The discussion  will be organized  around 
nine major findings. I.  Interwar investors exhibited sophistication and foresight at the lending stage.  Our 
analysis suggests that the past repayment  record of a country, its current political 
circumstances  and its economic policies all figured in the deteimination  of the risk 
premia on foreign bonds floated in the 1920s.  There is little evidence  that capital 
markets  have grown more sophisticated  over time, or that banks have a comparative 
advantage  in processing  the relevant information.  To the contrary,  the bond market's 
response to borrower characteristics  during the 1920s bears a remarkable resemblance  to 
experience during the post-1970  era of bank finance, 
2.  Neither monocausal  explanations,  nor for that matter multivariate  explanations  limited 
to economic variables,  suffice to explain the incidence  and extent of default.  While 
authors such as Diaz-Alejandro  (1983) and Fishlow (1985) have pointed rightly to the 
magnitude of the external shock, proxied typically  by the extent of terms-of-trade 
deterioration,  as a leading indicator of default, our own work reveals the importance  of 
other economic variables,  including the burden of the debt and the nature of the domestic 
policy response, as well as noneconomic  variables,  such as proximity  to a major military 
power and international  political links, 
3.  The implications of different debt-management  strategies for subsequent 
macroeconomic  performance  remain difficult to isolate. In the 1930s as in the 1980s, 
efforts to maintain debt service tended to be associated with fiscal  austerity, import 
compression  and export subsidies, while the decision to suspend payments  was often 
accompanied  by fiscal expansion,  monetary reflation and policies of import-substituting 
industrialization.  This wholesale reorientation of a country's macroeconomic  stance 
renders problematic any attempt to pick out the effects of external-debt  management 
2 from  the entire constellation  of policies.  The accumulation  of evidence points 
nonetheless to the conclusion  that countries which interrupted  service on their external 
debts recovered more quickly from the Great Depression  than did countries which 
resisted default.  This contrasts with the experience of the 1980s, for which it is even 
more difficult to discern a relationship  between different debt-management  strategies and 
subsequent  macroeconomic  performance. 
4.  There is little evidence that countries which defaulted in the 1930s incurred a cost in 
terms of inferior capital market  access after World War II.  Following the conclusion of 
negotiated  settlements  with the creditors, countries which previously had suspended 
interest payments  and amortization  were offered virtually identical access to the capital 
market  as were countries which had maintained  debt service without internlption  This is 
not to suggest that default was without costs us terms of market access, only that those 
costs were not borne differentially  by countries which interrupted  service on their debts 
once they reached settlement agreements  with the creditors.  Many of the costs were 
external to the defaulting countries:  neither defaulting  nor nondefaulting  debtors had 
significant access  to portfolio capital in the decades immediately  following World War II. 
5.  The readjustment of defaulted debts entailed a protracted  process of negotiation.  The 
analogy with Chapter 11  corporate  bankruptcy proceedings,  in which default and 
readjustment  permit a clean break with the past, is no more applicable to the 1930s than 
to the 1980s.  In many cases, interruptions  to debt service were only sporadic,  and 
uncertainty  over the magnitude of transfers  lingered for decades. 
6.  In contrast to the experience of the 1980s, interwar default in some cases led to a 
substantial  reduction of transfers from debtor to creditor.  What we might call  selective 
3 debt relief' was, however, compatible  with a reasonable  overall rate of return to the 
creditors.  The risk premia charged ex ante sufficed to elevate the average realized rate 
of return on sovereign  loans above the yields on British and U.S. Treasury bonds. 
Losses to creditors on provincial,  municipal and corporate loans, although more 
extensive, were still sufficient to yield positive ex post returns to British investors. 
7.  Notwithstanding  the contrast conventionally  drawn between  the extent of government 
involvement  in debt negotiations  in the 1930s and the 1980s, creditor-country  govern- 
ments often were intimately  involved in the readjustment of interwar debts.  The 
difference between the 1930s and 1980s lies not in the extent of government  intervention 
but in its direction.  In recent years creditor-country  governments  have exerted 
conthuous pressure on the debtors to maintain service on their external debts.  In the 
1930s and 1940s creditor-country  governments  pressured  debtors and creditors alike. 
8.  Global schemes to short-circuit  the protracted  process of bilateral negotiation proved 
unavailing.  Nearly every element of the global plans proposed in the 1980s -- a special 
international  lending facility, matched injections of private and public funds, conversion 
of existing assets into new ones featuring  different contingencies  --  was first suggested in 
the 1930s.  Ultimately, those global schemes foundered on the issues of who  should fund 
and control their administration.  The failure of the global plans offered in the 1930s 
does not leave one optimistic about their prospects in the 1  990s. 
9.  Unlike global plans, market-based  debt reduction made  a useful contribution to 
resolving the debt crisis of the l930s by reducing the debt overhang and eliminating 
marginal creditors.  There is little systematic evidence that debt buybacks had a 
significant impact on secondary  market prices, whose movement seems to have been 
4 influenced primarily by changes in the prospects for a negotiated  settlement. In contrast 
to their public statements of disapproval,  creditor organizations  were  willing in private to 
entertain buybacks out of reserves as part of the readjustment  process. 
1.  The Lending Stage 
The international  capital markets in the 1920s are accused of having engaged in all 
manner of excesses.  The issue houses pushed questionable  obligations on hesitant 
borrowers  and questionable  bonds on otherwise  cautious investors./ New entrants into 
the supply side of the market -- large New York banks which  foresaw a series of lean 
years in wholesale and industrial banking, and jumped on the new bandwagon  of retail 
banking"  --  were particularly  guilty of such infractions.3j But they  were not alone. 
Private investors discriminated  inadequately  between good and bad credit risks.4/ 
Governments  failed to monitor the industry adequately  and to discourage dubious 
activities,  even erring in the other direction  as when, for example,  they encouraged  the 
flotation and purchase of German bonds.5/ 
So it is alleged.  Unfortunately,  most of these assertions  are difficult to test with 
precision.  It is tempting to cite, as successive authors have done,  the poor cx post 
performance of interwar loans as proof of the validity of the interpretation. There are 
obvious dangers  with drawing conclusions  on the basis of 20-20 hindsight, however. 
There was no reason  for investors in the 1920s to anticipate an unprecedented 
macroeconomic  crisis on the scale of the Great Depression. That their loans performed 
poorly given the exceptionally  poor state of the world does not suffice  to impugn the 
lending process. 
5 It is more informative  to consider the market's ex ante assessment of the risks of 
foreign  lending.  In Table  1  we report estimates of the determinants  of spreads over risk 
flee rates on foreign loans floated in New York and London in the 1920s.  This analysis 
utilizes ex ante yields to matutity on two samples of foreign bonds.d/  The regressions 
relate the spread between those ex ante yields and contemporaneous  Treasury bond rates 
(consol rates for the U.K.) to counrty characteristics,  current economic policies and 
shifting capital-market  conditions.  The specification  parallels that adopted by Edwards 
(1986),  who sought to address Guttentag and Herring's (1985) contention that rates 
charged foreign borrowers  on bank loans could not have incorporated  adequate 
countay-risk premia because they varied so little across  loans.  Edwards attempted  to test 
this hypothesis for both bank loans and bonds by regressing spreads on indicators for 
countay risk such  as the magnitude of the debt burden, the level of investment, the policy 
stance of the debtor govemment,  and other characteristics  of the borrower  and the loan. 
While he found for the bond market that the spread rose with the debVGNP ratio and 
fell with the investment/ONE  ratio, consistent with the hypothesis  that lenders 
distinguished  among good and bad credit risks,  his other coefficients  were insignificant, 
suggesting  that investors  pald inadequate attention to other indicators  of counuy risk.7J 
The regressions  in Table 1  seek to replicate the essence of this analysis for the 
l920s.  The spread on each  loan is related to the value of the debt (scaled by exports), 
to the category of borrower (national  governments  versus others),  to the year in which 
the loan was issued,  and to the geographical  location of the borrower.  We include also 
two measures of current economic policies  and conditions  in the borrowing  country: the 
wade balance and the budget balance.  For the 1920s it is not possible to construct a 
measure of the investment  share of ONE like that used  by Edwards for the  1970s and 
6 Table I 
Determinants  of Spread Over Risk-Free Rate 
Dependent Variable is Sprearl 
Dollar Bonds  Sterling_Bonds 
Coefficient  Coefficient 
Constant  2.61  0.31  1.97  0.46 
Value/Exports  -0.07  0.24  0.0007  0.0007 
Municipal  0.11  0.18  -  - 
State  0.07  0.17  -  - 
Corporate  0.76  0.16  -  - 
National Bank  0,04  0.34  -  - 
Other Bank  0,14  0.28  -  - 
Dominion  etc. Cena1  -  -1.52  0.38 
Dominion  etc.  Local  -  -  -1.25  0.69 
Foreign Corporate Stocks  -  -  -0.45  0.25 
Trade Surplus  -0.20  0.25  -0.56  0.40 
Budget Surplus  -0.80  0.40  -0.12  0.41 
1921  -0,12  0.26  -  - 
1922  0.04  0.25  -  - 
1923  -0.01  0.36  -  - 
1924  0.17  0.29  0.18  0.48 
1925  0.19  0.27  039  0.52 
1926  0,40  0.26  0.09  0.44 
1927  0.38  0.26  -0.01  0.45 
1928  0.07  0.27  0.22  0.45 
1929  0.06  0.28  0.20  0.48 
Western  Europe  -0.73  0.18  0.33  0.26 
Eastern Europe  1.21  0.26  1.15  0.33 
Canada  -1.38  0.19  -0.69  0.85 
Cenal America  -0.79  0.29  -  - 
South America  0.50  0.21  0.38  0.67 
Japan  0.05  0,36  -0.03  0.38 
Auso'alia  -0.91  0.45  -0.29  0.67 
Note:  for dollar bonds 1920 is the omitted  year,  while for  sterling  bonds  1923  is  omitted. 
The  omitted country is  Germany,  while national government s the  omitted category  of 
Dcrrower 
F-carea  3 69  0.91 
S T. of Regressn  3.00654  3.3876 
3nher,fObserrtios  ___  2i,__ ,_____ 1980s.  But neither were investment statistics available to prospective  bondholders. 
Instead, contemporary  investment manuals urged investors  to focus on the trade and 
budget balances as the two most important  indicators  of a country's capacity to generate 
and mobilize the foreign exchange required to service external debts di! 
The spread on the dollar loans in column  1 varies considerably,  with a mean of 2.6 
percentage points and a standard deviation  of 1,1  The omitted alternatives  from the 
vectors of dummy  variables (which are picked up by the constant term) are 1920, 
Germany and national government  bonds,  The coefficients on years indicate little 
tendency of tile spread to widen or narrow over time, as one would have expected had 
foreign  lending tended to come into or fall out of fashion.9/ Relative to the omitted 
alternative (national govermnent  loans), higher spreads were charged on loans to states, 
municipalities,  corporations and banks, which is consistent with the ex post evidence that 
loans to national  governments  outperformed  these other loans from the creditors' point of 
view.IQI Only the coefficient on loans to corporations  differs significantly from that on 
the omitted alternative, however,  In the case of sterling loans,  where the omitted. 
alternative is U.K-guaranteed British Funds, again there is evidence of informed 
behavior:  higher risk premia were charged  on loans to local governments  than to central 
governments,  and on foreign than on Dominion issues.  These results contrast with those 
of Edwards for the 1970s; he detected no discernible  difference  in spreads on loans to 
different categories  of borrowers. 
In the equation for dollar bonds, the coefficients  on regions suggest, not surprisingly, 
that the best bond-market  reputations  were enjoyed by Canada,  the Central American 
republics and Western Europe.  Both Canada and the countries  of Western Europe had 
virtually unblemished records of servicing  their foreign debts, while the small Central American  republics economically  or politically  dependent on the United States  had little 
choice in the marterjjJ  Conversely,  the nations of Eastern Europe were charged the 
largest risk premia.  These  geographical variations  are suggestive of bondholder 
sophistication,  insofar as the pattern of ex post returns indoates that loans to Eastern 
Europe  were relatively risky and that those to Western Europe and Centtal America were 
relatively safe.  With hindsight, only the risk premium attached to German loans is 
anomalous.  The spreads on loans to Germany,  the leading borrower of American  funds, 
were smaller on average than those on loans not only to Eastern Europe and South 
America but to Austtalia and Japan as well.  This is consistent with the view of the U.S. 
State and Commerce Departments,  voiced as early as 1925, that American  investors 
tended  to underestimate  the risks associated with investment  in German bonds,12/ 
The results for sterling bonds are basically consistent.  The average spread is smaller 
(1.8 percentage points compared to 2.6 for the U.S.), perhaps reflecting the perception 
that British loans were less risky given their rather different geographical  destination;  the 
standard deviation of the spread is virtually identical (1.0 versus 1.1) to that for dollar 
bonds.  High risk premia were charged  the Eastern European  counthes, while Latin 
America, Greece and Germany stood in the middle and the Domlnions and Japan enjoyed 
the lowest costs of borrowing. 
The dummy variables for countries and regions capture a combination  of political 
factors influencing  the likelihood  of default and, presumably,  reputational factors related 
to past repayment performance. In a well-functioning  market, investors should also take 
into account current economic policies.  The coefficients on the trade and budget 
balances  speak to this question.  In the equations  for both steriing and dollar bonds, their 
coefficients  have the anticipated  negative  signs (larger trade and budget Surpluses tendcd 
8 to reduce spreads),  although only budget surpluses in the equation  for dollar bonds 
differs significantly  from zero at standard  confidence  levels.j31 
Absolute statements about the efficiency of a market are always problematic,  but 
comparative evaluations  are more sutghfforward.  In our case,  there is no evidence  that 
invastors were less discriminating  in the l920s than in the 1970s.  There is no evidence 
that either banks or the bond market possessed  a comparative  advantage  in the pricing of 
foreign loans, 
2,  Causes of Default 
The debt crisis of the 1930s unfolded in three stepsd4I  The first, spanning calendar 
1931, was dominated by Latin American  defaults.  Interest and amortization  payments 
were at least partially suspended  by virtually every South American  county but 
Argentina.  During the second phase, from the beginning  of 1932 to the middle of 1933, 
default spread to Southern and Eastern Europe.  The precise amount by which payments 
were reduced varied across countries, but most couniries were affected to some extent. 
The third phase. 'whose dawn coincided with the Monetary and Economic  Conference  of 
1933, was dominated by the default of Germany,  the single largest foreign debtor. 
In the 1930s as in the 1980s,  the debt crisis did not have a single cause.  Liberal 
foreign borrowing  in the l920s had increased the debtor counoles' vulnerability  to 
external shocks. In many Latin American  countries, by 1928 central government 
debt/export  ratios had risen to well in excess of 100 per cent, and interest and amorti 
zation on this component of the debt alone could require ten per cent of total export 
receiptsi5/ In certaln cases, debt/export  ratios were considerably  higher  (Table 2). 
Germany, the largest single foreign borrower, had reparations as well as commercial 
9 Tabki 
Central Government DebuExport Ratios 
(in percentage points) 
1222  1211  1235  1235 
Heavy Defaulters 
Brazil  153  163  215  127 
Bulgaria  263  288  na  416 
Chile  102  327  842  573 
Colombia  58  101  123  67 
Costa Rica  96  130  174  158 
El Salvador  106  153  183  157 
Germany  7  34  62  42 
Greece  415  750  633  474 
Guatemala  65  97  162  123 
Hungary  124  251  347  256 
Poland  135  212  472  355 
Uruguay  147  185  212  148 
Unweighted  Averages:  139  224  311  241 
Light Defaulters 
Argentina  49  73  113  81 
Australia  162  684  621  585 
Austria  78  157  310  274 
Belgium  87  111  190  240 
Canada  44  82  98  107 
Czechoslovakia  26  48  119  98 
Denmark  45  56  57  54 
Finland  52  128  74  51 
France  na  na  22  18 
Italy  12  17  28  30 
Japan  69  132  76  57 
New Zealand  278  454  400  350 
Nicaragua  30  42  53  46 
Norway  107  165  133  118 
Spain  43  95  137  157 
Venezuela  5  1  1  1 
Unweighted Averages:  72  150  152  142 
Notes:  na denotes not available.  War debts and reparations are excluded 
for France.  Figures for Australia starting in 1931 include state 
debts assumed by the federal authorities.  Those for Brazil and 
Chile include selected state and local debts assumed by the federal 
authorities. 
Source:  League of Nations, Annual Statistical Yearppç (various issues). debts with which to contend;  in 1928 reparations  transfers plus commercial debt service 
required more than 20 per cent of gross export receiptsid/ 
Starting in 1928 the debtor countries were battered by a series of external shocks 
which increased their transfer burden and reduced their debt-servicing  capacity.  First 
was the sudden decline in lending by the United States and other creditor nations.  The 
mounting boom on Wall Sweet diverted American  funds from foreign to domestic uses 
and like a powerful suction pump siphoned off liquidity from the rest of the world.  At 
the beginning of 1928 approximately  $800 million was required to meet foreign  d&ot 
service payments  on dollar debtsdl!  Net short- and long-term  foreign lending by the 
United  States had exceeded $1 billion in l927 and reached  nearly $700 million in 1928. 
Thus, despite the collapse of new lending in the summer of 1928, the new money 
provided between January and June nearly sufficed to finance that year's dollar debt 
service costs.  In 1929, net short- and long-term lending by the United  States earned 
negative,  and the $800 million bill came due,  As in the 1980s, part of the problem was 
the suddenness of the shift 
There could have been no less opportune  time for the collapse of global commodity 
markets.  Primary commodity  exporters had already come under strain.  Their terms of 
trade had been deteriorating  steadily over the course of the 1920s.  These then dropped 
like a stone with the onset of the Depression.  Lewis (1949) provides the sad litany. 
"From 1929 to 1930 the avenge price of wheat fei by 19  per cent, cotton 27 per cent, 
wool 46 per cent, silk 30 per cent, rubber 42 per cent, sugar 20 per cent, coffee 43 per 
cent, copper 26 per cent, tin 29 per cent, the index of prices of commodities  entering 
worid trade fell from 1929 to 1932 by 56 per  cent for raw materials, 48 per cent for 
foodstuffs  and 37 per cent for manufactures."iSI It is these  developments  that 
10 Diaz-Alejandro  (1983) and Fishlow (1985) stress as determinants of default.  They 
emphasize first that the collapse of real export revenues was so severe that countries 
could avoid default only through  the most decisive,  concerted action.  They suggest that 
the magnitude of the terms-of-trade  decline determined  for whom the necessary  steps 
were still feasible.  Argentina and Australia continued  to service their debts, for example, 
because as wheat exporters they suffered milder terms-of-trade  declines than countries 
like Brazil,  which exported coffee, or Bolivia, which exported tin. 
The impact of the export-price  collapse on foreign exchange  receipts was reinforced 
by the contraction of export volumes.  Between 1929 and 1932, world trade in foodstuffs 
fell by 11 per cent, trade in raw materials by 19 per centj9/  These observations  are 
consonant  with the explanation  for default which emphasizes  the magnitude of the 
external  shock. 
Empirical analysis of the incidence  and extent of default suggests, however, that the 
commodity lottery' (Diaz-Alejandro's  phrase) was only one of several determinants  of 
the borrowing  countries' response.  In Eichengreen  and Portes (1986) we reported 
regressions  relating the percentage of government  and government-guaranteed  debt in 
default (for all levels of government)  at various points in the 1930s to a vector of 
country characteristics.  These results confirm the importance  of the commodity- 
composition  of exports  and the export price shock:  more severe  terms of uade declines 
increased the incidence  and extent of default.  But in addition to the commodity  lottery, 
the extent of default was significantly  related to a number of other variables.  Holding 


































































 Importantly,  however, we found that, in addition  to these measures of changes  in the 
debt burden and in debt-servicing  capacity,  two other sets of variables conditioned the 
default decision, First, the domestic response to the external  shock played an important 
role.  Countries which prevented  large government budget dficits from emerging, 
through either tax increases or expenditure  reductions, were less likely to default than 
their less  spendthrift counterparts.  To put the point another way, governments  least 
willing or able to retrench fiscally were least able to avoid default.  Second,  political 
aspects of the decision whether or not to suspend debt-service payments appear to retain 
a role even after we control for economic characteristics  of the country.  For example, 
our equation significantly  underpredicts  the level of debt service maintained  by Australia. 
That Australia avoided default on even a portion of her external debt (nonwithstanding 
attempts to suspend interest  payments  by a left-leaning  state  government  in New South 
Wales in 1931, which were countermanded  by the national  authorities) we attribute  to 
political ties to the country (Britain) to which the vast majority  of the debt was owed. 
Overall, this analysis provides a nuanced picture of the debt-servicing  decisions of 
borrowing countries.  One cannot sustain the argument that the severity of the external 
shock left each defaulting  country with no other option.  Neither does it appear that the 
only factor differentiating  their situations  was the extent of the terms-of-trade  decline. 
The seventy of the external shock, the vulnerability  of the economy, the domestic  policy 
response,  and a broader range of political factors combined  to influence the decision. 
3.  Macroeconomic Repercussions of Default 
In the 1930s as in the 1980s, efforts to maintain external debt service entailed the 
compression of imports to generate foreign exchange,  and a surplus on the non-interest 






































































































 and government-guaranteed  debt.  As tax revenues  declined  with the deepening 
Depression,  governments  were forced to impose  draconian  cuts on current expenditures  in 
order to avoid unmanageable  public-sector  deficits,  As export revenues declined and 
international reserves were run down, the  authorities  were orced to adopt increasingly 
stringent monetary  stances in an effort to strengthen  the balance of payments.  In 
combination, these policies would be expected  to have depressed domestic  demand  in 
general  and on  investment  demand in particular.  Governments  willing to suspend interest 
payments  had more scope on this account for adopting monetary  and fiscal policies 
conducive to recovery. 
There  are obvious parallels with the 1980s, when the Latin American debtors,  in a 
desperate effort to maintain  service on their debts, have been forced to adopt policies of 
austerity which have resulted in nearly  a decade of slow growth.  But many observers 
have cautioned the debtors that a moratorium or default, while it may offer immediate 
macroeconomic  benefits in terms of scope for the adoption of reflationary policies, may 
also have macroeconomic  costs in terms of disruptions  to export- and capital-market 
access.  Exporters may  encounter  difficulties  in obtaining trade finance or suffer 
retaliatory trade sanctions. 
For the 1930s it is possible  to compare  economic  performance  across countries 
adopting very different policies toward their external  debts.  Figures  1  and 2 compare  the 
rates of growth of national income  and industrial production, respectively,  of the  'heavy' 
and  'light' defaulters.W  Both GNP and industrial production appear to have expanded 
more quickly in the "heavy defaulters  after 1931.  The simple comparison  suggests that 
countries which opted for default recovered  more  successfully  from the ravages of the 































































































 There are several reasons to treat the comparison  with caution.  For one, the 
constellation  of policies influencing  growth may have differed across countries  in ways 
that are not directly attributable  to their different debt-management  strategies.  Moreover, 
there is the problem of sorting out the direction of causainy.  As we explained in Secacn 
2, countries suffering more severe declines in income were more likely to default; now 
there is a suggestion  that countries which defaulted enjoyed  more rapid income growth. 
There is nothing incompatible  in the two arguments,  but two-way causation  poses 
problems of identification.  Even if the problems posed by the joinr endogeneity of 
default  and output growth can be solved, there is still the possibility  that because 
production declined more dramatically  before  1931 in countries which lapsed into default, 
the emergence of higher levels of unemployment  and excess capacity may have offered 
more  scope for output to snap back later.  After suffering more serious terms-of-trade 
declines  before  1931, the serious defaulters  may have benefited from more rapid 
terms-of-trade  improvements  as international  commodity  markets  recovered  thereafter. 
In fact, however, Figure 3 while confirming  the greater severity of the terms-of-trade 
shock suffered by the heavy defaulters immediately  after 1929 suggests that, with the 
exception of 1934, the terms of trade of the two groups of countries  subsequently evolved 
more or less in parallel.2jJ 
Data limitations, along both the quantity and quality dimensions,  preclude the 
estimation  of a simultaneous-equations  model  to sort out these effects definitively.  Our 
approach is to rely instead on a sequence of simpler descriptive  analyses.  None 
eliminates all of the problems acknowledged  above, but all tend to point in the same 
direction. Table 3 displays regressions  in which we relate rates of growth of industrial 
production to both debt-management  strategy (as measured  by the share of government 
and government-guaranteed  debt, for all levels of government, in default) and the 
severity of the external shock (as measured by the terms of trade).22/ To control for 
cross-country  differences  in the secular rate of growth, the dependent  variable is defined 
as the deviation from the country mean for that variable for the sample period, 
eliminating  the need for a constant term./ To control for changes over time in the 
global econorñic environment,  we include a vector of dummy  variables for years. 
When the terms of trade is included along with the measure of default, both 
variables tend to be associated with variations  in growth. Although the coefficient  on the 
terms of trade exhibits  instability,  in general it appears that countries  suffering  more 
severe external shocks grew more slowly, as one would expect.  And strikingly,  countries 
with a larger share of their external debts in default grew more quickly.  This continues 
to be the case when the vector of dummy variables for years is added and when the 
terms of trade variable is dropped. 
One problem with basing inferences on these regressions  is the likelihood that the 
default variable is endogenous.  In defense of the ordinary least squares regressions  in 
Table 3 one might argue that only past output growth affects current default,  while 
current default influences future output, rendering  the system recursive.  In practice, it is 
entirely possible for effects to run in both directions within  a calendar year, however. 
But the direction of any endogeneity  bias should only reinforce  conclusions  drawn from 
the ordinary least squares regressions  in Table  3.  Output growth should have a negative 
effect on default, while according  to Table 3 default had a positive  impact' on growth. 
If endogeneity  is present, it is likely to bias the coefficient  on default toward  zero, 
15 Table 3 
Default and Economic  Performance in the 1930s:  A Statistical DcscriptiQn 
Dependent Variable is Annual Percentage  Change in Industrial Production 
Between the Previous and Current Years, Where the Current Year Runs from 
1929 Through 1937 
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions  Two Stage Least Squares Regressiotm 
Terms of Trade  -9.67  -l&89  -824  -10.39  -3.98  -4.41 
(6.45)  (8.35)  (5.63)  (9.32)  (11.51)  (7.08) 
Percent of Debt  0.26  0.33  0.20  0.46  0.99  0.59 
in Default  (0,04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0,15)  (0.15) 
ImportJGNP  Ratio  1.47  0.61  2.51  1.30 
*100  (0.26)  (0.19)  (0.41)  (0.29) 
1930  -1.95  2.71 
(2.37)  (3.46) 
1931  -10.48  -7.37 
(2.22)  (3.12) 
1932  -18.11  -15.83 
(2.28)  (2.83) 
1933  -12.21  -12.83 
(2.29)  (2.92) 
1934  -2.91  -4.26 
(2.26)  (2.89) 
1935  5.31  3.19 
(2.39)  (2.89) 
1936  16.07  11.82 
(7.30)  (2.95) 
1937  24.53  19.69 
(10.62)  (3.36) 
Standard  Error  16.49  16.12  10.64  17.03  20.93  12.74 
of  Regression 
0.15  0.23  0.68  0.10  0.10  0.52 
number  of  214  214  214  204  204  204 
observations 
Notes: Dependent  variable, terms of  trade and import/GNP  ratio are  all defined  as 
deviations  from  country  mean for that variable for the  sample period to eliminate 
country effects.  Standard errors appear  in parentheses.  Number  of  observations 
varies because some variables  are not available for some countries for some years 
S  :rce:  See text. rendering  the estimates in the first three columns  of Table 3 lower bounds.  The final 
three columns therefore report two-stage  least squares estimates,  which utilize as 
instuments for the percentage of debt in default the determinants  of default identified  in 
Eichengreen  and Portes (1986).  These confirm that the coefficient  on default tends to 
increase in magnitude with this adjustment24l 
To test the  rubber band effect"  (that countries which suffered the largest declines in 
output in the early stages of the Depression  had the greatest scope for recovery 
subsequently),  we regressed the rate of growth of production over the recovery period 
(193 l36) on our default variable, the percentage change in the terms of trade, and the 
percentage change in production  between  1929 and 1931.  Table 4 confirms that the 
effect is present but that its inclusion does not reverse the coefficient  on default. 
The problem with such regressions  is that they may fall to conirol  adequately for 
other respects in which the external environment  and the stance of domestic economic 
policy conditioned  the pattern of growth.25/ On the side of pohcy, the decision whether 
to continue external debt service was only one of a number of interrelated policy 
responses to the macroeconomic  shocks  of the 'thirties.  Lacking an articulated model of 
fiscal policy, there was little conscious  manipulation  of budgetary instruments  in the 
1930s.2Q  Monetary policy was more widely utilized, although monetary authorities were 
constrained by inflationary fears, by the desire to defend the gold standard,  and by 
doubts regarding  the effectiveness of monetary reflation.  The most widely  adopted 
measures were the complex of policies referred  to under the rubric "import substitution." 
With the collapse of their export markets following  1929,  governments  adopted policies 
designed, to varying degrees,  to reduce their economies' dependence  on exports  and to 
shift resources to import-competing  uses.  Exchange  rates were devalued,  first in 
16 Table 4 
1931-37 Percentage Growth of Output 






Constant  0.353  0.151 
(0.094)  (0.056) 
Percentage change in  -0.417  -1.313 
dependent variable  (0.419)  (0.403) 
1929-31 
% of total government  0.002  0.002 
debt in default  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Percentage change in  -0.074  =0.089 
terms of trade  (0.023)  (0.174) 
193 1-37 
Standard error of  0.258  .188 
regression 
R2  .113  .522 
Number of observations  25  24 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source:  See text. Australasia and Latin America and subsequently  in other parts of the world.  Increasingly 
comprehensive  systems of tariffs and quotas, often supplemented  by exchange controls, 
were  used to limit imports.  In some counties credit was extended by the public sector 
on favorable terms to import-competing  industries, and a variety of other measures were 
adopted to promote theft growth. The use of such policies may well have been related 
to the choice of debt management  strategy.  Countries like Argentina. for example, which 
continued  to service theft debts did so by retaining resources in the export sector and by 
relying on imports for the provision of other goods.  Other counties like Brazil, which 
reduced or suspended  debt-service  payments,  had neither as urgent a need to generate 
foreign-exchange  receipts nor as favorable access to certain creditor-country  markets,  and 
had reason to shift resources into the import-competing  sector.fl'  The simple correlation 
of -0.30 between the measure of default in Table 3 and the import share of GNP (pooled 
time-series cross-section  data, defined as the deviation  of the import share from the 
country avenge for the sample period) is consistent with this view. 
The consensus  view of such policies as they operated in the last quarter century is 
that they have proven inferior to the alternative  of export promotion.2I Experts indict 
import substitution  strategies for having insulated producers  from the chill winds of 
competition, for diverting resources into sectors far removed from comparative  advantage, 
for raising the cost of inputs into domestic production,  and for discouraging  industry 
from achieving minimum efficient scale.  But it need not follow that import substitution 
was an inferior strategy in the l930s.  Some country studies suggest that import 
substitution worked rather well in particular  instances29/  It is conceivable,  for example, 
that the effectiveness  of import substitution relative to export promotion may depend on 
the nte of expansion  of international  trade.  When trade is expanding  rapidly, as  in the 
17 Tab15 
GDP Growth 
(annual  average, percent) 
1979-82  1982-86 
Reschedulers 
Argentina  -0.74  0.38 
Brazil  3.36  4.03 
Chile  1.42  -0.37 
Costa Rica  -1.08  1.63 
Ecuador  3.84  1.98 
Mexico  6.12  0.06 
Morocco  3.31  3.83 
Peru  2.77  -1.39 
Philippines  4.57  -1,16 
Uruguay  0.97  -2.25 
Yugoslavia  2.11  0.72 
Non-Reschedulers 
Colombia  3.16  2.67 
Egypt  2.50  4.63 
India  2.75  5.19 
Indonesia  6.54  3.61 
Israel  2.64  1.98 
Korea  4.28  8.47 
Malaysia  7.37  3.94 
Venezuela  -0.08  -0.22 
Notes:  Average growth of Mexico, Morocco, Peru and Indonesia 
is for 1982-85.  Average growth of Egypt is for 1982-84. 
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics  (various years). pDC  i7OCYT"'  ,mayt  .1  c:r:c  c-:u 
economies  o tlt k,€omodve;  wher. rtadc expands  slowly, :- may ra :' cnside  otr 
opuons 
In an  attempt to capture  the effects of this complex of policies, we added to the 
Table 3 regressions  the import share of GNP relative to the counny average for the 
sample period.  This measure captures not the different growth prospects of more- and 
less-open economies  but rather the implications  of policies tending to increase or reduce 
the rate of import growth. The coefficient  enters with a positive sign and differs from 
zero  at standard confidence  levels, suggesting that counthes which raised their capacity 
to import most rapidiy in the 1930s recovered  most quickly  from the Great Depression. 
More significantly  for our purposes. the coefficient  on percentage of debt in default is 
robust to the inclusion of this additional measure of economic policy  stance. 
if the data for the l930s suggest a positis e relationship between default and 
subsequent  economic performance,  the evidence for the 1980s is much more ambiguous. 
Part of the problem is the difficulty of distinguishing different debt-management 
sategies.  Most authors' measure of interruptions to debt service, namely prevalence  of 
rescheduling,  is an imperfect proxy.  Figure 4 and Table  5, which  compare growth rates 
of GDP for defaulting  and nondefaulting  counthes, confirm that the growth of 
reschedulers accelerated  in 1984-85 relative to 1982-83, but shows  that their performance 
was still substantially  worse than that of the non-reschedulers.  Whereas only one of the 
non-rescheduiers  shows  a deterioration  in  its  fiscal position.  six of the reschedulers  do 
(Table  6).  Investment ratios drop much more dramaticaliy  in reschedulcrs  than in 
nonreschedulers  (Table 7). 
18 Figure 4.  Average Growth,  1979-85 
Reachedulers  (countries  from  World  Debt  Tables  categorized  ss Msior  Borrowers 
or Highly  Indebted  Countries,  excluding  sub—Sshsran  Africs,  which had  not 
rescheduled  prior  to 1983 hut did reschedule  101 or more of their  total debt 
in  in;  f The  -ears  1983—85,  thereby restricting  attention  to countroea 
:ar  reacheduled  only  after the 1982 crisis)  include Argentina,  Brazil, 
ole, Coata  Rica,  Ecuador, Mexico,  Morrocco,  Peru,  Philippines,  Urusuan, 
V05051i0  Eon—reaohedulers  include Colombio,  bgvnt,  India,  Indonesia, 
CrjeL, Rorea,  M;1 ivela and Venezuela. 
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98S Once again, the problem with such comparisons  is that  they fail to control for other 
respects in which countries  differ.  One attempt to do so finds little evidence that 
rescheduling  promoted  growth.  Analyzing  macroeconomic  performance  in 52 
developing countries, Linden 0988) finds that reschedulers  performed  less well  (as 
measured by the rate of growth of GDP) than did other countries, This result comes 
through even when instrumental  variables are used in the attempt to eliminate 
simultaneity  bias. 
Two explanations  for this difference  between the 1930s and the 1980s suggest 
themselves.  First, compared to rescheduling  in the 'eighties, default in the 'thirties 
offered more scope for redirecting  domestic resources toward investment and other 
domestic uses,  Interruptions  to debt service in the 1980s have been partial and 
intermittent,  and the net resource transfer to the creditors remains large.  Second,  the 
macroeconomic  repercussinns  of default may have been different when interruptions  to 
debt  service were widespread, as in the 1930s, rather than relatively isolated, as in the 
1980s,  It may have been harder for creditors to impose sanctions against defaulting 
debtors precisely because default was so widespread.fl/  This brings us to the question 
of how foreign investors and their governments  responded to the crisis. 
4.  Default and Capital Market  Access 
The immediate way for creditors to retaliate against default was to exclude the 
debtor from the capital market.  Starting in 1825,  the London Stock Exchange  refused 
quotation to new loans of governments  in default on outstanding  obligations and in 
extreme instances refused to quote all loans of the offending government.  There existed 
no comparable  arrangement in New York,  although  it was still possible for individual 
creditors to refuse accommodation  to defaulting  borrowers. 
19 Table 6 
Central Government Deficit or Surplus 
(average of annual figures, percent of GDP) 
1979-82  1983-86 
Reschedulers 
Argentina*  -5.4  -8.4 
Brazil*  -2.0  -3.7 
Chile  3.0  -2.2 
Costa Rica  -4.5  -2.2 
Ecuador  -2.8  -1.9 
Mexico*  -7.1  -3.1 
Morocco*  -11.4  -7.5 
Peru*  -1.7  57 
Philippines  -2.4  -2.6 
Uruguay  -2.6  -3.0 
Yugoslavia  -0.4  0.0 
Npn-Reschedulers 
Colombia  -1.9  na 
Egypt  -13.2  -11.0 
India*  -6.3  -7,7 
Indonesia  -2.1  -1.5 
Israel*  -15.0  -14.7 
Korea  -2.6  -0.9 
Malaysia  -10.4  -10.0 
Venezuela*  -0.9  1.4 
Notes:  Asterisks denote 1983-85 rather than 1983-86. 
For Yugoslavia, deficit or surplus is measured as 
percent of gross material product. 
Source:  IFS  Yearbook (IMF) except: 
Brazil 1985:  Government Finance  Statistics  Yearbook 
(GFSY) 1987 
Ecuador 1979 and  1980:  GFSY and IFS Monthly  izl to 1985:  IFS Monthly 
Urugi:y 979:  IFS Monthly Investment Ratios 
(average of annual figures, percent of GDP) 
1912  1983-86 
Reschedulers 
Argentina  2(16  12.5 
Brazil  21.9  17.9 
Chile  18.2  13.0 
Costa Rica  26.4  23.5 
Ecuador  25.0  18.3 
Mexico  26.1  21,0 
Morocco  23.2  21.1 
Peru  19.2  16.7 
Philippines  30.3  18.1 
Uruguay  16.1  8.8 
Yugoslavia  42.6  29.8 
Non-Reschedulers 
Colombia  19.6  18.2 
Egypt  32.2  23.4 
India  24.5  24.1 
Indonesia  24,9  28.2 
Israel  23.2  20.6 
Korea  30.8  29.7 
Malaysia  32.9  30.7 
Venezuela  26.3  15.4 
Note:  Mexico is 1983-85 rather than 1983-86. 
Sources:  International  Financial Statistics  (various years) and 
(various years). That the capital  markets reacted strongly to the defaults of the 1930s is beyond 
question.  For years -- in fact decades  -- following the defaults of 1931-33 the volume of 
portfolio lending remained depressed.  Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s did 
portfolio capital flows recover with the entry  of the money center banks into the business 
of international  retail banking.  The conclusion  draw  Dy  a generation of American  and 
European  investors from 1930s experience was that direct foreign investment was 
preferable to purchases of foreign bonds.  As a spokesman of the U.S. National 
Association  of Manufacturers  put it in 1949,  After the experience of the 'thirties and the 
serious balance of payment difficulties now plaguing most of the world, the superiority 
of equity over loan financing has, we believe, a universal appeal."3j1  Few deceived 
themselves  into believing that the risk of nationalization  of direct foreign investments 
was negligible;  that it was thought  to be significantly  less  than the danger of default on 
foreign portfolio investments  is an indication of the scars left by interwar experience. 
But there is scant evidence that defaulting  debtors  were differentially  affected.  On 
the basis of their study of six large Latin American  debtors,  Jorgensen and Sachs (1988) 
find no observable capital market penalty for  1930s default in the period 1950-64. 
Lindert and Morton (1987)  conclude from their study of more than a century  of inter- 
national  lending experience  that  "defaulting governments  have seldom been punished, 
either with direct sanctions or with discriminatory  denial of later credit."  Eichengreen 
(1987) analyzes  borrowing  by a cross section of 32 countries in the first post-war decade, 
relating foreign  borrowing  to both demand-side  variables (as proxied by country charac- 
teristics such as openness, export variability and inherited debt) and supply-side  variables, 
notably past  debt-servicing  performance.  In those results there is no apparent relation- 
ship between severity of interwar default and ability to borrow immediately  after World 
War II. 
20 This is not to deny that lenders were cognizant of default,  But the reaction  against 
portfolio investment abroad  was general rather than selective.  A general  sigh of resolve 
was to be heard over the United States,  Herbert Feis wrote.  Never again should we 
lend or invest our money in foreign lands.'32J  American  investors,  having been rudely 
reminded of the special risks of foreign loans, revised their assessment of the desirability 
of lending abroad, The British and others reacted similarly, and they  were significantly 
constrained by controls on capital movements  until the end of the 1950s.  Hence the 
market for portfolio investments  remained becalmed for more than a third of a century. 
Sovereign  default may have had costs in terms of disruptions to capital market access. 
But many of these costs were external  to the defaulting  countries and affected the market 
access of defaulters  and nondefaulters  alike. 
Two  caveats to this conclusion  are in order.  First, the generality of the capital 
market's reaction may have been a function of the generality  of default.  Default having 
been so widespread, it led to a comprehensive  reassessment  of the risks of international 
lending which redounded unfavorably  even on countries which had kept their debt 
service up to date,  In contrast,  in periods like  the 1920s, when  the only countries in 
serious  default were Mexico and the Soviet Union,  and the 1970s, when debt problems 
were much more isolated  than they became subsequently,  the market may have been 
more inclined  to focus on the creditworthiness  of particular countries and less  inclined to 
reassess the entire enterprise.  Second,  the market's tendency to discriminate among 
countries according  to their past debt-service records may differ during periods of 
stagnation and buoyancy.  Ozler (l988b) suggests  that during the boom in bank finance 
in the  1970s, larger spreads over the risk-free rate were demanded of countries  with 
records of having defaulted on loans in the past/  Still, there is little evidence  that 
defaulters  were rationed out of the market  or that faithful rervcers  were rationed 5.  The Settlement Process 
Observers of the current debt crisis deplore its protracted nature.  Investment ar 
,rowth remain low,  while uncertainty  about the resolution of the crisis continues  to 
depress bank share prices and to increase the vulnerability  of the money center banks t 
destabilizing  shocks.  Often a contrast is drawn with the era of bond finance,  when 
debtors were able to make a clean break with past problems and divert scarce resources 
to productive domestic uses and creditors were able to get on with their business. 
In fact, even in the era of bond finance the readjustment  of defaulted debts often 
entailed a protracted process of sporadic suspension and renegotiation. Service might be 
suspended in part or in full, restarted for some years, suspended  again  and so forth. 
Negotiations with the creditors often proceeded  on a on-again,  off-again  basis, and 
required as much as a quarter of a century to complete.  Bolivia, the first country to 
default in 1931, was also the last major debtor to settle in 1955. 
Brazil's experience is illustrative34i By 1931 the Depression  had caused a 
precipitous fall in Brazilian exports,  leading the government  in October 1931 to suspend 
interest payments unilaterally on most of the nation's external debts.  In March 1932 a 
plan was announced to issue 20 and 40 year funding bonds to capitalize  interest arrears, 
and to resume normal interest  payments  no later than  1934.  But in 1934, with the 
advice of British financial experts, Brazil announced  a plan  to readjust the debt.  The 
Aranha Plan, designed to run through  1937, limited debt service to roughly half of 
Brazil's net export receipts.  Bonds were divided into seven  grades.  tth funding loans 
and other select obligations  to receive full  interest, other Federal, state and local loans 
partial interest (from 17.5 to 50 per cent of contractual  levels), and certain state and 
municipal loans no interest.  At the end of 1937, with the external situation  little 
22 improved,  debt-service  payments  were suspended  again.  Following sporadic negotlations 
with the creditors,  in 1940 Brazil announced  another temporary,  four year settlement, 
under which the seven categories  of bonds distinguished  in 1934 were to receive interest 
at somewhat  modified  rates.  Finally,  in 1943 Brazil and her creditors negotiated  a 
permanent readjusment, in which bondholders  had the option of choosing between two 
plans, one which reduced interest rates from 30 to 70 per cent of contractual levels, and 
a second under which they would surrender 20 to 50 per cent of capital in exchange for 
a cash payment of 6 to 60 per cent of par value and somewhat  higher interest rates on 
the remainder, 
Thus,  while there may be some truth to the notion that in the era of bond finance 
debtors were better able to jettison their debt overhangs and redirect resources toward 
domestic uses, the extent of the difference  should not be exaggerated. Even when 
payments  were in suspension, there was often a real possibility  that they would be 
restarted.  In the 1930s as in the 1980s, investors  had reason to be wary about committinc 
funds to domestic investment  on the grounds  that the authorities still might tax the 
returns and devote them to debt service. The difference  between periods lies not in the 
uncertainty  or in any difference  in investment-debt  service links, but  in the willingness 
and ability of governments  to reduce payments by a substantial  fraction  of contractual 
rates, 
The central difficulty that negotiators  had to surmount was the large-numbers 
problem created by the existence of a multitude of bondholders,  it was even harder than 
in the era of syndicated bank lending to solicit the opinions of the creditors on a 
settlement proposal.  Yet the British  and, after  1933, the Americans came up with a 
remarkably  efficient solution to the representation  problem.  Cornmitees were appointed to negotiate with the debtor.  Bondholder; ;oietimes we  asKed 
with the committee,  other times slmsy  r;g.star Ss a. interes'eti  ic 
Readjustment  plans were signalled by the publication  of an offer or simply  by an 
announcement  that  bond covenants were henceforth  modified,  If the plan was judged to 
be fair or at least to be the best that could be expected, the committee would recommemi 
its acceptance  by the bondholders.  The latter signified their approval by cashing a 
coupon or, when requested, by exchanging  the old certificate for a new one.  The only 
option available to dissident bondholders  was to hold out for better terms. 
The recommendation  of a reputable bondholders  committee was the seal of approval 
on an offer.  In Britain, where the Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders  (CFBH) had been 
in existence since  1868 and was universally acknowledged  to represent the creditors,  that 
recommendation  carried considerable  weight.  When the CFBH recommended  an offer, 
any Stock Exchange sanctions  could be expected  to be withdrawn,  and thssiden 
bondholders had little hope of obtaining better terms.  In  the United States, a comparable 
organization  was created only in 1934 when, with State Department  prompting,  the 
Foreign Bondholders  Protective  Committee came into operation.  Prior to that time, 
bondholders relied on ad hoc committees created to deal with individual  defaults.  The 
ad hoc nature of such committees  tended to inflate  administrative  expenses,  while the 
existence of rival  committees,  as well as committees  of dubious reputation,  made  it 
difficult for both debtors and creditors to determine  who best represented the interests of 
the bondholders. 
6.  Terms of Settlement 
In contrast to the experience of highly indebted  countries in the 1980s, interwar 
default led in some cases to a substantial  reduction in net resource transfers from debtors 
24 to creditors.  The estimates of Linden and Morton (1987). Jorgensen and Sachs (1988) 
and Eicheneen and Portes (1986,  1988b) aee on this point.  Our own calculations, 
based on two large samples of foreign bonds issued in the 1920s, reveal in addition 
considerable  variation in debtor and creditor experience34l 
To summarize  the performance  of foreign loans issued between  1920 and 1929, we 
calculated the nominal own-currency  internal  rate o. return on more than 300 issues. 
These are summarized  in Table 8.  For dollar bonds, at one extreme the realized return 
marginally exceeded the contractual rate, as in the cases of Norway and Canada,  due to 
early debt retirement. At the other extreme, the realized internal rate of return might 
reach  substantial  negative levels, such  as -7.4 per cent for Brazil, -9,8 per cent for 
Bolivia and -14.76 per cent for Hungary,  indicating that not just interest but a substantial 
fraction of principal was written off by the creditors. 
On average,  however, both British and American creditors recovered their  nncipal. 
Our calculations  suggest that,  for creditors with diversified foreign bond portfolios who 
were willing to hold out for final settlement, the defaults of the 1930s were not as 
disastrous  as typically portrayed.  The average nominal internal rate of return  (weighted 
by issue value) was roughly 4 per cent on dollar bonds and in the range of 5 per cent 
for sterling issues.  While dollar bondholders  settled for approximately  half of contractual 
interest and sterling bondholders  settled for only slightly more, on balance the former did 
only slightly  worse than if they had held domestic Treasury  bonds, and the latter did 
slightly better.  Ex ante risk premia were  nearly sufficient to compensate  American 
bondholders  for the risks of foreign lending, while for British bondholders  they more 
than  sufficed.  Although  some debtor countries received what can be interpreted  as 
substantial  relief, overall the defaults of the 1930s did not inflict unsupportable  losses on 
the creditors. Table I 
Realized Rates of Return on Overseas Bcip  Issued 
in the 1920s. by Borrowing Region 
(in percentage points) 
Dollar Bon  Sterling Bonds 
RgIQn 
Central America  1.46 
South America  3.50  1.44 
Germany  1.12  3.61 
Other Western Europe  4.83  4.81 
Eastern Europe  2.04  1.45 
Canada  5.08  5.18 
Australia  5.97  5.26 
Japan  6.20  5.30 
Other Asia  -  5.92 
Africa  -  5,62 
Notes:  Rates of return on sterling bonds calculated on the 
assumption that repurchases occurred at market prices. 
Returns on dollar bonds use market price or par retirements 
as specified in the bond covenants. 
Source:  see text. Three factors contributed to the rather different experiences of investors in dollar and 
sterling bonds.  First, loans to different categories of creditors fared very differently in 
the 1930s and 1940s.  For both sterling and dollar issues, loans to national governments 
yielded higher realized returns than loans to states and municipalities;  loans to states and 
municipalities  in turn yielded higher realized returns than loans to foreign corporations. 
And American investors purchased  a disproportionate  share of the speculative  bonds 
issued on behalf of foreign municipalities  and corporations.  Second,  London and New 
York channelled funds in different geographical  directions.  London  specialized in new 
overseas issues on behalf of the Commonwealth  and colonies, and devoted a smaller 
share of capital than New York to riskier loans to Latin America and Central Europe.  It 
is difficult to assess the extent to which London's behavior is attributable  to the 
sophistication  of a more experienced  market,  to long-standing  political and financial ties 
with the Commonwealth,  to preferential  British tax treatment on colonial issues, or to the 
Bank of England's intermittent  embargoes on foreign issues.3!  But the combined  result 
of these factors was a significantly  lower incidence  of default on sterling than on dollar 
issues. 
The differing prevalence of default does not by itself account,  however, for 
international  differences in realized rates of return.  British creditors also recovered more 
successfully  in the event of default.  For the bonds in our sample,  the average default on 
a dollar issue cost the creditors more than four percentage points on realized rate of 
return, while the average default on sterling issues cost them only about two percentage 
points.  Part of the difference  may be attributable to the greater effectiveness  of the 
British  Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders than of its American  counterpans.d/  Part 
may  also be attributable  to the different stances of the British  and American 
governments,  to which we now turn. 7.  Government Intervention 
A  recurrent theme in much of the recent literature on the debt crisis (viz. Sachs 
1986) is that creditor-country  governments  have continually  pressured the debtors to 
maintain service on their obligations.  One might think that in the  1930s and 1940s, 
when creditor-country  banking systems held only a small share of their portfolios  in 
foreign bonds and hence were  not at risk in the event of foreign default, creditor-country 
governments  might have felt less compulsion to intervene.31/ This view is supported  by 
the tendency of British officials between the wars to cite the remarks of their well-known 
19th-century predecessors to the effect that the British government  was not a debt 
collector.  American officials  argued likewise that the higher returns on foreign loans 
than on contemporaneous  domestic investments represented implicit acknowledgement  of, 
and compensation  for, the special risks of lending  abroad, and that investors had no 
justification for seeking assistance. 
In fact, governments  were intimately  involved in interwar debt readjusiments.  There 
is nothing unprecedented  about the extent of government  intervention  in the 1980s,  The 
extent and nature of this involvement varied over time and across creditor countries. 
Thus, British governments  in the 1930s  were  more willing to intervene  than the Roosevelt 
Administration.  The British used the Ottawa Agreements  of 1932, which provided 
preferential British market access  to the Commonwealth  and Empire at the expense of 
foreign exporters, to secure favorable treatment of sterling debts by Argentina,  in return 
for tariff preferences  under  the provisions  of the 1933 Roca-Runcirnan TreatyJ/  The 
Americans were more hesitant to link trade and debt,  especially once Roosevelt  was 
converted to the arguments  of Cordell Hull and the U.S. began to move back toward 
freer trade with the adoption of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements  Act in 1934.  The 
27 links between U.S. Export-Import  Bank loans and commercial  debts varied over time, 
On some occasions the U.S. extended Eximbank loans despite  the existence of unsettled 
defaults;  on others officials made clear that Eximbank decisions had a political dimension 
and might be torpedoed by Congress without progress on the debt front.  Along with 
several European  governments,  Britain threatened  to impose clearing  arrangements  upon 
Germany following her default in 1933, leading to the partial or full resumption  of 
service on Germany's European  bonds.  No clearing was threatened  by the United  States, 
and no significant interest payments were made to Germany's American  creditors over 
the remainder of the decade.  But until the outbreak of World War II involved 
governments  directly in nearly every aspect of international  trade and finance,  their 
intervention  was limited largely to instances where public officials had actively promoted 
the original issues (as in the case of Germany's Dawes and Young  Plan loans) or when 
the debtor discriminated  against one class of national creditors in favor of others. 
With the approach of the war, creditor-country  pressure for settlement intensified. 
But in contrast to the 1980s, on more than one occasion considerable  pressure  was 
applied to the creditors as well  as the debtors.  In addition to providing  information and 
advice to the bondholders' representative  committee and objecting to discriminatory 
provisions  included in settlement offers, governments  sometimes  intervened directly in 
negotiations if they felt that progress was inadequate.  A favorable settlement for the 
creditors was not often viewed  as  a  high priority relative to international  trade 
concessions  and international  security agreements.  Creditors were urged to settle,  in no 
uncertain terms, if their obstinacy  stood in the way of these other goals. 
Essentially,  the difference  in government intervention  in the l930s and 1980s lies 
not in its extent but its  direction,  Where U.S. officials in the 'eighties have made clear the priority  they attach to maintaining debt service, in the 'thirties and 'forties, when 
governments  intervened,  they might pressure both debtors and creditors to reach an early 
agreement. 
8.  Global Plans 
The debt difficulties  that arose at the beginning of the 1980s for Poland,  Turkey 
and others were regarded as country-specific  problems.  This perception  was transformed 
by the Mexican and Brazilian crises in August-September  1982.  These countries  not only 
required emergency  rescue packages, but  their problems brought the international 
fmancial community to recognize that it faced a generalized  debt crisis. 
The policy reaction was guided partly by the objective of avoiding contagion 
effects that might lead to a general financial crisis like that of the early 1930s (see 
Eichengreen  and Portes, 1987,  for a comparison).  The perception that serious debt- 
servicing  problems were  already  widespread prompted  the elaboration  of several 
proposals  for global solutions.  These plans have been surveyed and analyzed by Cline 
(1987) and Fischer (1987),  Most involved  taking the debt off the books of the 
commercial  banks at a discount and reducing the debtors' repayment obligations 
correspondingly.  Typically, they required  a new or existing international  financial 
institution  to implement the scheme. 
Objections to these plans center on three points:  the need for a grand political 
agreement  to authorize and initiate the scheme, for uniformity  of procedure  for all 
debtors or at least for agreed criteria for discriminating  among them,  and for taxpayers  in 
creditor countries to defray the cost of debt relief.  For all three reasons such ge-ieral 
schemes seem unlikely  to be adopted. 
29 Most authors of global solutions to the debt crisis of the 1980s are unaware that 
similar plans were widely discussed  half a century earlier,  Some, like current proposals 
under which the World Bank or International Monetary Fund would play  a central role, 
suggested  that the newly-established  Bank for International  Settlements  be endowed with 
the funds and authority needed to readjust defaulted debts on a global basis.  Others 
advocated  instead an independent  facility under the control of private creditors,  Some 
advocated  converting existing debts into new obligations,  not unlike the debt-equity 
swaps and seniority provisions so fashionable  teday, while others emphasized  the need to 
index payments  to export revenues (compare Fern under Oarcia) or to service  the debt in 
local currency (see  Dornbusch,  1988). 
Four sets of global  schemes can be distinguished39/  The first proposed to endow 
the Bank for International  Settlements  with the resources needed to resolve  the crisis. 
The B.I.S, had been established  in 1930 as part of the Young Plan rescheduling of 
German reparations;  it was logical to propose that it might also take charge of other debt 
problems.  Hubert Henderson,  a highly-placed  British government  economic  advisor, 
suggested that the B.I.S, issue unbacked  'International  Certificates"  to exporting  countries 
to finance debt service payments  and other economic needs. 
The 1931 Kindersley-Norman  Plan, named after Montagu Norman,  Governor  of the 
Bank of England, and Robert Kindersley,  one of its directors,  proposed the establishment 
of a new international  facility to make loans to countries and corporations  unable to 
obtain them through normal  channels.  This new international  entity was to be 
capitalized by the leading  creditor-country  governments  and further financed through the 
sale of bonds to private investors,  The agency would extend  new loans to indebted 
countries unable to obtain  them through the market,  "reestablishing  the credit of the 
foreign Governments,  corporations,  etc., to whom  the money  is lent ... improving  the price of their securities ...  and the purchasing  power of their  nationals.4Q/  Like a 
mutual fund, .t would in effect resell packages of these claims to private investors in the 
creditor countries. 
The Beyen  and Crena de Jongh Plans, offered by a pair of Dutch bankers  to the 
Standstill Conference  in the winter of 193 1-32, addressed the problem of short-term 
debts.  Beyen proposed to convert short-term  debts frozen by debtor governments  into 
long-term  obligations repayable  in installments  over as long as 20 years.  Debtors  that 
did not possess enough foreign exchange to meet their current obligations might be 
permitted to make payment in local currency and to extend preferential  treatment to 
creditor countries who were their best export customers.  Crena de Jongh took the idea 
of payments  in domestic currency a step further. He proposed a central administrator to 
issue foreign-currency-denominated  bonds; the administrator  would accept repayment of 
short-term  obligations in domestic currency, invest the currency at home, and pay the 
creditors out of the proceeds. 
Finally, a variety of proposals  were mooted during the preparatory  meetings that 
preceded the World Economic  Conference  of 1933.  In a series of meetings with U.S. 
officials,  Britain proposed the establishment  of a  normalization  fund  to channel capital 
toward countries requiring foreign funds for purposes including the resumption  of debt 
service.  British officials suggested  up to $2 billion of capitalization  for the fund, to be 
subscribed  by creditor-country  governments.  Representatives  of the debtor countries 
endorsed variants of the plan. 
It is a pessimistic commentary  on the global plans currently under consideration  that 
none of their interwar predecessors  bore fruit.  Implementing  those schemes would have 
required a serious  commitment  on the part of the leading creditor-country  governments. 
31 But at each juncture, domestic problems diverted  their attention  from the international 
debt crisis,  In 1931 Britain was battling increasingly intense balance-of-  payments 
difficulties,  which ultimately  drove her from the gold standard in September of that year. 
In 1933, the Roosevelt Administration  turned toward devaluation  and away from 
international  policy coordinatioo  precisely when the World Economic  Conference  was 
poised to take up the debt problem.  As a result that conference limited its efforts  to the 
increasingly turbulent exchange-rate  situation. 
Even when governments  and banks were willing to entertain the possibility of an 
international  debt facility, there remained insoluble problems of finance and control. 
Under the provisions  of the Kindersiey-Nomian  Plan, for example,  the bulk of new 
finance was supposed to come from private investors, But the large investors,  such as 
J.P. Morgan,  expressed their unwillingness  to contribute  unless control over any new 
organization  also rested in private hands.  For their part, governments  insisted that 
control be allocated according  to the nationality  of the finance.  In 1931, for example, 
the Bank of France insisted that control rest with it on the grounds  that the largest single 
share of the funds would be donated by Paris. 
Finally, there were debilitating  disputes over what countries  and what obligations  to 
include.  At the 1933 World Economic  Conference  the United States declared all 
discussion of war debts off limits,  The realization that debt relief on inter-allied 
obligations  was unlikely to be forthcoming  weakened the resolve of European  countries 
who  would have preferred to take up the whole interlocking  set of debts. 
9  Market Solutions 
In contrast to global plans, market-based  debt reduction made a useful contribution 
to the resolution of the interwar debt crisis,  We refer to repurchascs  of bonds  un the 
32 market, often at prices substantially  below par.  Similar practices have been discussed 
recently by Portes (1987), USUNA (1988), and Williamson  (1988), and been utilized 
extensively  by Mexico  (for private sector debt)  and by Bolivia.  Their efficacy has been 
a subject of controversy.4jJ The argument that buybacks  out of reserves leave the debtor 
worse  off (since reserves are sacrificed without  any reduction in the debt, the market 
price of remaining obligations  simply rising to reflect the country's unchanged 
debt-servicing  capacity) is difficult to reconcile with the revealed preference of interwar 
governments, many of which utilized the option extensively,  as well  as  with the market 
prices of the bonds repurchased  at the time.  In 1939 the Foreign Bondholders  Protective 
Committee estimated that a dozen countries in default had repatriated  between 15  and 50 
per cent of their bonds since the beginning of the decade.  Jorgensen and Sachs estimate 
that Bolivia repurchased  five per cent of its defaulted debt at an average price of 16, that 
Chile retired 18 per cent at 59, Colombia 22 per cent at 22, and Peru  31 per cent at 21. 
Buybacks were controversial.  Dorribusch (1988) points to opposition by some 
creditors,  while Skiles (1988) notes that  because creditors  objected so strenuously to the 
practice,  most of these bond repurchases  were carried out through intermediaries." 
Another interpretation  of the use of intermediaries  was that debtors wished to avoid 
driving  up bond prices by signaling their policy through first-person appearance  in the 
market.  In fact,  the time-series  behavior of bond prices suggests little systematic 
reaction to repurchases of securities in default,  There is little evidence that debtors 
sought to depress prices immediately prior to repurchases,  or that buybacks  had a major 
impact on price trends.  Figure 5, for example,  displays high and low market prices for a 
sterling loan  to the Chilean Government  issued  in the 1920s, along with estimates of the 
volume of repurchases  of bonds (valued at par).421  The data for a variety of other bonds 
33 tell  a similar story.  The Chilean case is particularly  interesting since the country was 
one of the first to engage in extensive buybacks  and was the target of criticism by 
creditors.  Figure 5 shows that the buyhacks of the second half of the i930s, second half 
of the i940s and first half of the 1950s were not preceded by unusual declines in bond 
prices, nor did they result in major price increases, although in the 'thirties and 'forties 
some upward movement in prices is observed, 
The private attitude of the bondholders committees toward repurchases  differed 
significantly  from theft public position on the question.43]  10 public the bondholders' 
committees  complalned  that any available foreign exchange  should be allocated to thc 
resumption  of debt service and contractual amortization  rather than to repurchases of 
defaulted bonds at a discount.  They objected  to the potential for debtors to manipulate 
bond prices by declaring their inability to service their debts, and then to turn around and 
retire the debt as soon as the prices fell.  In private,  the committees  were much more 
receptive to the practice,  especially if it was accompanied  by the resumption of at least 
partial debt service payments,  and when the creditors were unlikely to receive a better 
offer. 
Numerous  examples  could be cited.  For example,  in December 1936, following  the 
unilateral  imposition of restricted  repayments  and interest by Chile, representatives  of the 
U.S. bondholders  refused to accept the reduced interest payments that had been deposited 
in New York.  Chile then borrowed  from  Schroeders in London on this security in order 
to purchase bonds in the market.  The Council of Foreign Bondholders  did not object;  it 
noted with satisfaction that  "the Finance Minister so far has obtained and used $4 million 
for purchases."J  As part of the 1940 temporary settlement recommended  by the 
Council, the Brazilian authorities devoted 'at least $400,000  in each of four years"  to 
34 Figure 5  CbiIe 
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36  4Q  $4  ;6o  1O  i85  7O  1Th  re  —  vie*-ow  — purchases  in the English market.45J  In the 1941 Colombian  negotiations,  the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders was asked to agree that all the sterling debt be repurchased  in the 
market.  While it objected to the "disastrous precedent" that might be set, its members 
admitted that "we have long become acclimatized  to the idea of a debtor being allowed 
to devote some sums to amortization,  provided  that he is paying  on 
the principal of his debt."45/ Typically, the bondholders  argued that purchases below par 
should  take place only if at least partial  service was being paid.  Thus, in 1944 the 
Council of Foreign Bondholders  decided "to refuse to consider a settlement of the 
Ecuadorean  debt by means of a purchase offer at below par" unless  at the same  time the 
bondholders were offered an option of partial service on the debt.47/ 
Perhaps the most revealing exchange surrounded  the hearings of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange  Commission  investigation  into defaulted for bonds in 1937.4W  The SEC 
had recomnended that in order to curb the repatriation  of bonds by defaulters  measures 
be introduced to restrain bankers and brokers from dealing on behalf of governments  in 
default,  The Council of Foreign Bondholders  noted that such restraints on repurchases 
would be met with "strong and  ...  effective criticism on the ground that, by limiting thc 
market in such bonds, it would act detrimentally to the bondholders, "49/ 
Clearly,  debt buybacks were controversial.  But many British  and American  experts 
regarded them favorably,  especially  when they were accompanied  by other measures 
designed to readjust the debt. CONCLu,It,r' 
The inte:nion i debt crises of the 1930s and ud  i96us  aiftr in  undamenia 
In the 1920s iendi. g was mediated  by the bond tric  n th' .97Os by the COWIPC 
banks.  Since the tending mechanism  differed,  so thu  me met sm f  aegotian 
readjustments  of defaulted debts.  In the 1930s otit't dccault was common,  aibeit 
sporadic.  In the  1980s, in contrast,  serial reschedulirigs  and other expedients  so far hivr 
prevented a significant spread of formal default. 
Despite these differences,  this earlier debt crisis sheds light on a number of aspects 
of the current sirjation.  It highlights the advantages,  from the viewpoint of financial 
stabthy, of dispersing foreign obligations  across large iumbers of private investors rather 
than concentrating  them in the hands of financially  vulnerable commercial  banks.  While 
remmaing us of th ophistication of the bond market, it shows that bondholders 
hisor.sally  have been no more  adept than the banks it, avoiding loans to countries  ith 
regsahd tendency to default.  It alerts us to the central role creditor-country  governments 
can piay in promoting or impeding  a negotiated  resolution of the crisis.  Finally, it 
reminds us of the serious obstacles  to the implementation  of any global plan  for 
resji  .g the debt crisis and underscores the useful contribution  to resolution offered  by 
market-based  debt-reduction  schemes. 
36 FOOTNOTES 
1.  See Eichengreen  (1987,  1988) and Eichengreen  and Fortes (1986,  1987,  1988a,b). 
2.  For two accounts of the literature on loan pushing  in the 1920s, the first of which is 
more agnostic than the second, see Skiles (1988) and Darity and Horn (1988). 
3.  The quote is from de Cecco (1985), p.57.  See also the evidence on the lending 
practices of different banks in Mintz  (1951). 
4.  See the discussion in U.S. Senate (1932). 
5.  See for example Schuker (1988). 
6.  The two samples of foreign bonds are described  in Eichengreen  and Portes  (i988h. 
For Britain we constructed  estimates for all 125 overseas  bonds offered for subscription 
and listed by the  while for the U.S. we drew a stratified 
sample  of 250 foreign  bonds from the list of more than  1400 such bonds published in 
Young (1931).  After adjusting for the actual price paid by the purchaser, we then tracked 
interest and amortization  payments  until the bond issue was extinguished and calculated 
the nominal own-currency internal rate of return.  The number of bonds included in the 
regression  analysis was limited by the availability  of explanatory  variables.  For a similar 
analysis utilizing grouped data which yields results generally consistent with those 
reported below, see Eiehengreen  (1988). 
7.  Edwards's results for bank loans are basically consistent.  In addition,  see Ozier 
(1988a), who suggests that spreads decline with the amount of time the borrower  has 
been in the market. 
8.  See for example Madden  and Nadler (1929).  Other variables to which investment 
advisors referred included the natural resource endowment  of the country and the position 
of the central bank. 
9.  For both sterling and dollar bonds, the coefficients have signs consistent with this 
hypothesis,  but it is impossible  to reject the hypothesis  that each individual  year effect is 
zero,,  This contrasts with the analysis of grouped data for the U.S. in Eichengreen 
(1988), where there was some apparent tendency of the spread to rise over the course of 
the 1920s, suggesting  that investors recognized  the increasingly  risky nature of foreign 
loans. 
10.  We discuss this evidence  on cx post returns in Section VI below. 
11.  Under the provisions  of the Hay-Bunau Vaiilla Treaty of 1904, the U.S. was 
permitted  to intervene in Panama to preserve order and to supervise the expenditure  of 
government  loars placed in the U.S.  Under the Platt Amendment,  the US. was entitled 
to object to  improvident  or otherwise objectionable fiscal policy  in Cuba.  The 
Dominican  Republic  was under US. military  administration until 1924, and thereafter  the 
US, retained  the right to object to changes  in Dominican  tariffs  and public debt.  Haiti 
was  ruder US, martial,  law from. 1916 to 1931  See Angell (1933),  pp. 827. 12.  For examples  of State and Commerce  Department  warnings of the risks of German 
loans, see Eichengreen  (1988), 
13.  Obviously, the greater precision of the estimate of the coefficient  on budget balance 
in the equation for dollar bonds compared to its sterling counterpart  may reflect the 
larger sample size. 
14.  This chronology follows Eichengreen  and Portes (1987). 
15.  Central government  debt to export ratios are not representative  of the level of total 
debt.  They are, however, the only debt indicators  available for a wide range of 
countries, which is why we present them in Table 2.  'Where state and local  government 
debts were  substantial, the total government  debt to export ratio could be much higher. 
Germany's for 1931  rises from 34 to 212 per cent,  for example.  Schulker (1988), p. 65. 
16,  Calculated  from statistics in Harris (1935). 
17.  Lary (1943), p.  6 and Table ifi after p.  216, estimates that debt service on dollar 
loans amounted  to $900 million in 1929.  The stock of U.S. portfolio investments  abroad 
at the end of 1929 was on the order of $7.2 billion,  Subtracting  net short- and long-term 
lending in 1928 and 1929, which totalled $576 million (Lewis, 1938, pp.628-629)  and 
multiplying  the 1927/1929 ratio of debt stocks by $900 million  yields $828 million. 
18.  Lewis (1949), p.  56. 
19,  Lewis (1949), p.  58. 
20.  Both figures  are constructed from unweighted  averages of country  data.  The heavy 
defaulters  are Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia,  El Salvador, Germany,  Greece, 
Guatemala,  Hungary,  Poland and Yugoslavia.  The light defaulters are Argentina, 
Australia, Austria,  Belgium. Czechoslovakia,  Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, 
New Zealand,  Nicaragua,  Norway and Spain.  Sources are described  in the data appendix 
to Eichengreen  and Portes  (1986). 
21.  It is tempting to ascribe the 1934 improvement  in the commodity exporters' terms oT 
trade to the 1933-34 devaluation of the dollar.  Why the heavy defaulters  should have 
benefitted more is not clear,  however. 
22.  We use industrial production  indices rather thar GDP because their wider 
availability  permits the inclusion of more countries.  (We also suspect that the indusu'ia 
production indices are more reliable.) Table 4 below documents  that the choice  of 
dependent variable is of little  moment. 
23.  When the constant term is included, it differs from zero only because of rounding. 
The first equation  of Table 3 becomes: 
IP = -0.15  - 9.70  Terms of Trade  0.26 Default 
(1.08)  (6.47)  (0.04) 
with standard errors in parentheses. 
38 24.  Insmiments include the debt/income  ratio, the 1928 export/GNP ratio, and dummy 
variables for British Commonwealth  and Latin American  countries (which were  shown to 
be significant determinants of default in Eichengreen and Fortes, 1986). 
25.  Defining the dependent  variable for each country in Table 3 as the deviation  from 
that country's avenge gtwth rate during the sample period should,  by picking up secular 
differences  in national  growth rates, eliminate problems potentially  caused by our 
procedure of pooling together counthes at different stages of economic  development. 
26.  There were,  however, independent  expenditure  progams which de facto had fiscal 
effects,  such as commodity  price stabilization  schemes  and unemployment  insurance 
systems, although the magnitude of their effects is much debated. 
27.  Contrast Anglo-Argentine  trade relations as discussed in Section 7 and footnote 38 
beiow. 
28.  To cite but one well-known  statement  of the view, see Kmeger (1978). 
29.  See for example Fishlow  (1972) and a number of the studies contained in Thorp 
(1984). 
30.  As will become clear momentarily,  this is not a hypothesis toward which we are 
inclined. 
31.  Cited in Eichengreen (1988). 
32.  Feis (1950), p. 1.  Other obsewers were less pessimistic about the prospects for the 
foreign bond market.  As King (1950, p. ii) put it, "And so, economically  speaking, i 
would not call the prospects unfavorable,  if you were  to look for a foreign bond as a 
safe investurent  you would have to use care and judgement, you would have to consider 
the many different factors which I have mentioned or hinted at, the character of the 
country and the people, their industriousness,  their ingenuity, their good faith,  and 
policies of the governments,  their reserves of strength,  their vulnerability  to economic 
and technical  changes and so forth,  But I do not think  you would  be left high and dry 
without a candidate  for admission  -- except for one thing,  the political situation." 
33.  These results are consistent with those in Tabie 1, 'which suggest that in pricing 
foreign bonds in the 1920s investors took the past debt-servicing  records of counules into 
account. 
34.  Three accounts of Brazilian experience are Abreu  (1978), Cardoso and Dornbusch 
(1988) and Eichengreen  and Fortes (1988a). 
35.  In what follows  'we  concentrate  on the results reported in Eichengreen  and Fortes 
(1988b),  utilizing samples  of 207 dollar bonds and 125 sterling bonds issued between 
1920 and 1929.  This analysis  is an extension  of the pilot study utilizing two 
considerably  smaller samples first reported in Eichengreen and Fortes (1986). 
36,  For further discussion  of this possibility,  see Fichenereen and Portes (1988h) 37.  For the interwar data available on the weight of foreign bonds in American banks' 
asset portfolios,  see Eichengreen  and Portes  (1987), pp. 23-24. 
38.  Details on the Roca-Runciman  convention  and references to the surrounding 
literature may be found in Abreu (1984). 
39.  These plans are described in more detail in Eichengreen  (1989). 
40.  Quotation cited in Eichengreen  (1989), pp. 12-13. 
41.  See in particular the critique of Bulow  and Rogoff (1988). 
42.  We imputed the quantity of buybacks  from figures provided by the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders  in its Annual Reports on the par value of issues still outstanding. 
43,  We offer more archival evidence to this effect, drawn from the records of the 
Council  of Foreign Bondholders,  in Eichengreen  and Portes (1988a). 
44.  Council of the Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders,  Minutes, 17 December 1936. 
Emphasis added. 
45.  Council of the Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders,  Minutes, 14 March 1940. 
46.  Emphasis added,  Council of the Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders,  Minutes,  14 
December 1941. 
47.  Council of the Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders,  Minutes, 31 May 1944. 
48.  U.s. Securities  and Exchange  Commission  (1937). 
49.  Council of the Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders,  Minutes, 31 May 1937. 
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